A metaphysical interpretation and understanding of the world is neither scientifically attainable nor scientifically excluded. It is another mode of cognitive approach to the world, a transition from the (as much as possible) neutral observation of the world to a personal relationship with the world. It is a product of the freedom of humankind, and therefore interpretation and understanding define its entire stance towards the world, its mode of use of the world.
Introduction
In a recent paper (Nesteruk, 2012 [2] ) the issue of delimiters in cosmological research which originate in the structure of the human knower was addressed, in particular, how the purposiveness of human actions cascades towards the purposiveness of cosmological research (Nesteruk, 2012[3] ). The latter paper dealt with a "formal" purposiveness in cosmology related to the explicability of the universe. This explicability is linked to the human intentional search for the sense of its own existence in the universe, so that the purpose of explanation in cosmology is related to the explication of the human condition.
It was argued, in particular, that the theoretical representations of the "universe as a whole" and "the Big Bang" (as the encapsulated origin of the universe) act as the telos of cosmological explanation and, hence, as well, as the telos of anthropological explanation related to the origin of individual persons at birth (Nesteruk 2012[1] ).
In this paper we would like to discuss, as a case study, an interesting example of how scientific development in the 20 th century led a famous physicist John Archibald Wheeler to extend the naturalistic methodology together with classical ideal of rationality (where subject and object are entirely separated and the world is supposed to pre-exist independently of human insight and its activity) towards that which can be described as a phenomenological stance portraying man as the centre of disclosure and manifestation of the world. It is of interest that this extension has some teleological connotations, bringing teleology into the heart of scientific explicability of the universe.
Wheeler, after a long intellectual evolution working in physics, attempted to approach physical reality not as something "out there", which is passively described by observers, but to see it as a genesis through conscious dialogue between observers-participants and physical reality, so that the universe emerges as a special articulation of the relationship between human intelligence and physical reality (Wheeler 1994 [1] , p. 128).
This approach, challenging the natural scientific attitude, was not appreciated by physicists who found Wheeler's ideas "unpalatable in view of its rather mystical overtones" In what way, if any, is it, the observed, affected by man, the observer? Is the universe deprived of all meaningful existence in the absence of mind?
Is it governed in its structure by the requirement that it gives birth to life and consciousness? Or is man merely an unimportant speck of dust in a remote corner of space? In brief, are life and mind irrelevant to the structure of the universe -or are they central to it?" (Wheeler 1975 , p. 270). "The brain is small. The universe is large."
Indeed the size of the physical organ, which is responsible for mental articulation of the whole universe, is incommensurable with the spatial size of the visible universe. Still, and this is an existential fact, it is from within this spatial scale that the articulation of microscopic realities of particles and fields, as well as huge astronomical formations is possible by this organ. There is something in this incommensurability, which is not physical, or, at least is not based on physical interactions. The very idea of a continuum of the universe as a single and united whole, although inaccessible to the empirical grasp, reflects a non-local and non-physical property of the world which is detected by consciousness through the power of intuition.
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"In what way, if any, is it, the observed [the universe], affected by man, the observer? Is the universe deprived of all meaningful existence in the absence of mind?" Physics teaches us that, through our own spatial and temporal insignificance in the whole grandeur of the universe, we are just late newcomers into this world who only recently started to interfere with the physical environment on this planet.
Our ability to affect the cosmos at large is only a matter of science fiction and some futuristic prophecies. 4 However the question of Wheeler has another, much more serious dimension related to epistemology: will the universe as we observe it, that is see it in its particular contingent appearance as intricately related to our physiological and psychological constitution, be unconcealed to us in a different way, related to that measure, which man will be, in relation to that which can be unconcealed. Responding to the second half of a question formulated in the beginning of this paragraph, the question of the universe in absence of the human mind is an ontic question: indeed one can build, so to speak onto-cosmology (in analogy with ontotheology criticized by Heidegger), in which the universe will be an impersonal being allegedly Physics also gives chemistry and biology and, through them, observer-participators. They, by way of the devices they employ, the questions they ask, and the registrations they communicate… develop all they know or ever can know about In the words of another phenomenologist, A.
Gurwitsch, "nature" appears to be a "hypostasis of mental creations" asserting that consciousness is a product of blind physical forces and myriads of particles in the universe. However, the reference to blind physical forces and chance prior to the established human articulation is made as a matter of rhetoric because the universe as the "world of existences" did not exist "prior" to human subjectivity: "observers are necessary to bring the universe into being."
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The universe thus is a participatory universe; its existence is relational upon the existence of intelligent observers whereas the existence of observers is being relational upon the ingredients of the universe. There is a certain reciprocity between the universe and observers: one cannot exist without the other (DeLaguna 1966, p. 82).
As to the origin of reflecting and articulating consciousness in the universe, Wheeler sincerely believes that science will be able to provide an 
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However it is not difficult to realise that the notion of underlying physical substance to which one can make an ultimate reference is replaced by the network (community) of human observers who "create" the physical world as constituted reality.
In similarity with existential philosophy and theology Wheeler gives priority to human persons who produce meaning, rather than impersonal substance which is an abstract and impersonal Some other philosophers formulated a similar "eventiality" of the universe by referring to a communal character of events of knowing.
In P. Heelan's terms, "the phenomenon takes 'flesh' in the world differently because its 'flesh'
is determined only as a consequence of decisions taken by local and historical communities of expert witnesses" (Heelan 1992 , p. 58).
14 It is in this sense that the articulation of the past of the universe is an event within the life-world of a particular community loaded with a sense of the community's lived past and of decisions to be made in the future. As Heelan points out, "it is not the case that every historical event is also an event of a scientific kind…, but when the local community is one of expert witnesses, then the scientific data produced by that community are also historical events in relation to that community" (Heelan 1992 , p. 66). H. Margenau argued in a similar way that "physical reality" is best defined as the totality of all valid constructs.
In this approach the universe is defined not as a static, but as a dynamic formation: "…the universe grows as valid constructs are being discovered.
Physical entities do not exist in a stagnant and immutable sense but are constantly coming into being" (Margenau 1944 , p. 278). God) and says that "in our time the participants of the dialogue changed. They are the universe and man" (Wheeler 1994, p. 128 ). In the same passage he imitates the dialogue between the universe and man as an act of personifying the universe through the sequence of questions and answers.
The universe acquires a sort of "intelligibility" as its "natural artefact".
In conclusion, the main interesting result of Wheeler's attempts to sketch the "physics of It is not difficult to conjecture that the only "real" law which drives physics is the "law" that the universe must be explicable. It is impossible to deny this requirement for explicability even in "experiential fact" and determining the lines of scientific enquiry provides "the unlimited informative value for the universe and its laws" (Yannaras 2004, p. 117 See a careful explanation of the meaning of this term in (Nesteruk 2003, pp. 112-17; 2004 ).
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It was his last book, The Crisis of European Sciences (Husserl 1970) , where Husserl undertook a critique of the mathematisation of nature whose inception was associated with the name of Galileo. The topic was later discussed and developed in numerous papers. See, for example, (Gurwitsch 1967) , (Kvasz 2002 ).
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This is a short formulation of the Participatory Anthropic Principle. See (Barrow, Tipler, 1986, p. 22 ).
12
Wheeler argues that his approach to understanding the place and role of man in the universe contrasts to the selection mechanism of the many worlds (MW) version of the Strong AP (which assumes pre-existence not only of the visible universe, but also the multitude of other universes) in a sense, that the Participatory AP is "founded on construction" (Wheeler 1987, p. 310) . He articulates this contrast as an opposition in views on the place of man in the universe as mediocre versus central: "Life, mind, and meaning have only a peripheral and accidental place in the scheme of things in this view [i.e. MW-Strong AP (A.N.)]. In the other view [that is, Participatory AP (A.N.)] they are central. Only by their agency is it even possible to construct the universe or existence, or what we call reality. Those make-believe universes totally devoid of life are (according to this view) totally devoid of physical sense not merely because they cannot be observed, but because there is no way to make them" (Ibid.).
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The place of observer is not to "create out of nothing" in a theological sense, but to act an ancient god-demiurge who orders the universe from preexistent matter.
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The metaphor of 'flesh' is borrowed from M. Merleau-Ponty. 15 Margenau anticipated that many scientists would disagree with such an attitude because they maintain a faith in the convergence of the system of the entire set of physical explanations which would deliver them an ideal of their aspirations, that is a unique and ultimate set of constructs for which would reserve the name 'reality'. However he points out that this belief in convergence in question is problematic because it is not capable of scientific proof. ((Ibid). See also (Margenau 1977, p. 76) The situation in modern cosmology, where the ever increasing set of theoretical constructs reveals the components of the matter content of the universe which escape physical description points exactly to the danger of idealisation of the scientific description of the universe: the more details we know the less we understand the entirety.
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The concept of the life world was introduced in Husserl's Crisis (Husserl 1974 ) and was a matter of vast discussion by phenomenological philosophers. See for a recent review (Steinbock 1995 ).
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The fundamental problematic character of any philosophical enquiry into the nature of human consciousness is expressed in modern terms through a concept of the so called "negative certitude" meaning that the facticity of consciousness can only be approached with certainty in negative terms, that it is certain that its mystery can only be predicated in terms of that which is not this consciousness (see (Marion 2010, pp. 21-86) 
